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A Deeper Look at the “Neural
Correlate of Consciousness”
Sascha Benjamin Fink*
Institute 3, Philosophy-Neuroscience-Cognition Program, Otto-von-Guericke-Universität Magdeburg, Magdeburg, Germany
A main goal of the neuroscience of consciousness is: find the neural correlate
to conscious experiences (NCC). When have we achieved this goal? The answer
depends on our operationalization of “NCC.” Chalmers (2000) shaped the widely
accepted operationalization according to which an NCC is a neural system with a
state which is minimally sufficient (but not necessary) for an experience. A deeper
look at this operationalization reveals why it might be unsatisfactory: (i) it is not an
operationalization of a correlate for occurring experiences, but of the capacity to
experience; (ii) it is unhelpful for certain cases which are used to motivate a search
for neural correlates of consciousness; (iii) it does not mirror the usage of “NCC” by
scientists who seek for unique correlates; (iv) it hardly allows for a form of comparative
testing of hypotheses, namely experimenta crucis. Because of these problems (i–iv),
we ought to amend or improve on Chalmers’s operationalization. Here, I present an
alternative which avoids these problems. This “NCC2.0” also retains some benefits
of Chalmers’s operationalization, namely being compatible with contributions from
extended, embedded, enacted, or embodied accounts (4E-accounts) and allowing for
the possibility of non-biological or artificial experiencers.
Keywords: neuroscience of consciousness, experimentum crucis, neural correlates of consciousness (NCCs),
integrated information theory, recursive processing
Phenomenal consciousness is currently the target of a booming neuroscientific research program,
which intends to find the neural correlates of consciousness (NCCs). “Neural correlate of
consciousness” is then a core concept of this neuroscience of consciousness for at least
two reasons. First, because “NCC” defines the research goal of experiments: find neural
correlates of some conscious experiences, e.g. of the seen (rather than suppressed) image
in binocular rivalry tasks, of hallucinated voices in schizophrenic episodes, of out-of-body-
experiences, of red-experiences, of pains, of our dreams of flying, etc. Second, because the
notion of an “NCC” determines which cases are to be considered as test instances for
general scientific theories of consciousness: any scientific theory of consciousness is only
satisfactory if it says something about the neural signature of consciousness, at least in
us humans. In some instances (like binocular rivalry, dreaming, hallucination, etc.), neural
activation may be sufficient for certain experiences, because the co-occurring events in the
environment do not determine the character or content of these experiences. Thus, any
general scientific theory of consciousness ought to implicate NCCs in order to be testable:1
1In some sense, this holds even for extreme extended or embodied accounts which implicate that no neural activation is ever
sufficient for experiences. These theories therefore predict that nothing fulfils the criteria for an NCC. However, we ought to
specify first what “NCC” ought to mean; then it might turn out that our best supported theory of consciousness implicates
that there is nothing fitting this operationalization.
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if such a general theory implicates some neural activation as
a plausible NCC, but that activation fails to correlate with
conscious experience, then this gives us reason to reject that
theory as a valid theory of consciousness. (At the very least, this
lowers its credibility.) If such a general theory of consciousness
fails to indicate any empirically determinable NCC, then that
theory is either false, incomplete, or unsatisfactory.
NCCs are touchstones for (and implicated by) any theory of
consciousness, but “NCC” is not defined by any of these theories.
It is a notion that all theories in that field must share equally in
order to be comparable.
However, it is not obvious what makes something fall under
the term “NCC.” It is not a term of natural language, so we
cannot claim prior understanding, familiarity, or competence
with its use. And we have to defend it against triviality, because
events may correlate with each other to any degree between
−1 and +1, synchronously or asynchronously, and decreases
can correlate with increases, absences with presences. If we do
not introduce any restrictions on correlation, most events will
correlate with each other—but mainly in an irrelevant fashion.
If we accept any neural event correlating in any arbitrary way
to an experience as an NCC, then this endeavor may become
dangerously meaningless. So we have to specify which kinds of
correlations are the relevant or “right” ones.2
Which constraints on correlation may count as relevant or
“right” may depend on our pragmatic interests, i.e., what we want
to do with our knowledge of NCCs. For example, if we want to
know if someone is currently experiencing, e.g., a coma patient
or a dreamer, we will prefer to know synchronous correlates. If
we want to prevent experiences from arising (e.g., we want to
prevent a patient from regaining consciousness during surgery),
we may prefer knowing preceding (asynchronous) correlates
(because detection of these types of correlates would leave the
anesthesiologist time for interventions). I discuss other well
motivated constraints later on. So how ought we to understand
“NCC”? What should we want an NCC to be in order to
maximize its applicability?
First, I focus on how the term “NCC” was introduced by Crick
(1995). His operationalization had one major flaw, which was
pointed out by Chalmers (2000). Chalmers’s operationalization is
widely accepted by philosophers and neuroscientists alike. Even
though Chalmers’s operationalization avoids some problems, it
is not fully satisfactory, for which I argue in section 2: (i) it is
not an operationalization of a neural correlate of experiences
themselves, but of the potential to have such experiences; (ii)
it is impractical and unhelpful for cases which are commonly
used to motivate a search for NCCs; (iii) it does not mirror how
2It may be reasonable to presume that correlations approaching the extremes are
the most relevant, because they have the most justificatory and predictive power.
But even if events correlate to a relevant degree, then this does not show any
meaningful connection: the divorce rate in Maine (US) correlates to a degree
of+0.992558 with the per capita consumption of margarine in the US; the number
of honey producing bee colonies in the US correlates to a degree of−0.933389 with
its number of juvenile arrests for possession of marijuana (see http://tylervigen.
com). Even strong correlations can arise by accident without implying any kind
of relevance. For this reason, our knowledge of NCCs will not decide which
sufficiently specific solution of the mind-body-relation is the case, because each
can be made compatible with the NCCs we find by some ad hoc additions.
“NCC” is used by scientists, who seek for unique correlates, and it
leaves the relation between data and theory unclear; (iv) it hardly
allows for experimenta crucis, a form of comparative testing of
hypotheses widely held as important and beneficial to scientific
progress. In section 3, I present an alternative operationalization
and elaborate how it addresses these worries.
1. OPERATIONALIZING “NEURAL
CORRELATE OF CONSCIOUSNESS”
Operationalizing is an a priori endeavor where one determines
what it is that one searches for empirically: we introduce (or alter)
a term t by defining t operationally. More specifically, we state
the (preferably detectable) circumstances by which we determine
whether something falls under t or not. If t has a previous use, we
ought to preserve its connotations; if t has no previous use, we
can operationalize as we please; but whether we adopt this rather
than that operationalization of t will hinge on its usefulness: what
do we gain by thinking of t in this way rather than another?
Although “neural correlate of consciousness” has been used
before Francis Crick’s The Astonishing Hypothesis (1995),3 his
book is how the term got traction. Crick (1995, p. 9) writes
that we might possibly “explain to you the neural correlate of
your seeing red. In other words, we may be able to say that you
perceive red if and only if certain neurons (and/or molecules) in
your head behave in a certain way.” This is no straightforward
operationalization, but the phrase if and only if suggests that
Crick believed some neural activation to be both sufficient and
necessary for an experience: whenever neurons n1, ..., nx behave
in such-and-such a way, one experiences red—and when they are
inactive, one does not experience red.
1.1. The Mere-Sufficiency-Constraint
Chalmers (2000, p. 24ff) took issue with the requirement that
the activation of some group of individual neurons ought
to count as sufficient and necessary for an experience. There
are good a priori and a posteriori reasons to reject such a
“necessity-constraint.” First, if we were to accept and take some
individual neural activation to be necessary for an experience,
we reject several reasonable possibilities a priori. For example,
we rule out a priori that there could be artificial experiencers,
i.e., non-biotic conscious machines or programs.4 Second, by
accepting the necessity-constraint, we rule out a priori that we
could preserve consciousness with silicon brain prostheses: if
neural activation is necessary, then replacing a lesion with any
(however complicated) microprocessors would lead to a loss
of consciousness. There is hardly any conclusive uncontested
argument against these possibilities. Third, by accepting the
3Its first mention is in the philosophical journal Mind in an article by Marshall
(1901). Afterwards, it is mentioned in the Psychological Review (Weiss, 1917, p.
360f), two years after J. B. Watson ended his editorship. Then, it turns up again in
Sir William Mitchell’s Gifford Lecture The Place of Minds in the World (Mitchell,
1933, p. 123f). See also Griffith (1967, p. 25). It is unclear whether Crick adopted
the term from anybody. But while previous authors simply use the term, he is the
first to give an elucidation of what might be meant by it.
4For authors accepting the possibility of non-biotic consciousness, see e.g., Gamez
(2008); Holland and Goodman (2003); Metzinger (2004, 2013); Reggia (2013) or
anybody publishing in the International Journal of Machine Consciousness.
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necessity-constraint, we rule out a priori that the activation of
different populations of neurons in a brain could bring about
the same experience.5 Why should we rule this out a priori,
if redundancy is a posteriori plausible? Tiny lesions (e.g., due
to the natural death of individual neurons) do not seem to
affect our ability to have certain experiences, because there are
enough other neurons which still play their contributing roles. I
do not notice the death of individual neurons or even columns
by focusing on my experiences. Only if these lesions are large
enough do they affect my phenomenal experiences in a noticeable
way. Fourth, consider cases of plasticity, where patients regain
the capability for certain experiences after a lesion just like
they may regain certain cognitive functions (see e.g., Borgstein
and Grootendorst, 2002; Stein and Hoffman, 2003; Wieloch
and Nikolich, 2006; Murphy and Corbett, 2009; Wittenburg,
2010). Because we should rule out any of these possibilities a
priori, we are lead to a “mere-sufficiency-constraint”: for any
operationalization of “NCC,” any individual neural activation
ought to count at most as sufficient for an experience, but
not as necessary. For otherwise, neither artificial experiencers,
nor silicon brain prostheses, nor redundancy or plasticity are
possible.
1.2. The Minimality-Constraint
Rejecting the necessity constraint has an unwelcome
consequence: most neural activations which are sufficient
for an experience will also be uninformative. Say I hear Wagner’s
Tristan Chord while attending an opera at Bayreuth. The
activation of my brain as a whole is then sufficient for e.g.,
an experience of the note f , because f is part of this chord.
But the activation of my brain as a whole is also sufficient for
experiencing d♯, the experience of Isolde’s red dress, the pain I
feel from the uncomfortable chairs, and so on. Knowing that the
activation of my whole brain now is a neural correlate of hearing
f is uninformative, because I might never have this specific
overall brain activation again in my life. According to Chalmers
(2000, p. 24f, 32), what we desire to know is the minimal system
whose activation corresponds to an experience: which minimal
subset of the activation of my whole brain is by itself sufficient
for hearing f . We may call this the “minimality-constraint”: only
the smallest subset of a neural activation which by itself can bring
about an experience ought to count as that experience’s NCC.
By accepting the minimality-constraint, we cannot count the
whole activation of a brain as a neural correlate of an experience
e although, taken literally, it correlates with e in some sense.
5Think of a system composed of neurons n1, n2, n3. It is conceivable that the
activation of n1 and n2 brings about a red experience as well as the activation of n2
and n3 and the simultaneous activation of all three. In the first case, the activation
of n3 is redundant—if one would lesion n3, the organism could still experience red.
But one could also lesion n1 without prohibiting the organism from experiencing
red, because in the second case, n1 is redundant. However, one cannot lesion both
n1 and n3 without the organism losing its capability of experiencing red—the
activation of n2 by itself is not sufficient for red experiences. In this case, there
is no single set of individual neurons sufficient and necessary for red-experiences.
And because there is no reason to rule out such a mapping a priori, we should not
subscribe to the necessity-constraint.
1.3. Chalmers’s Operationalization
Chalmers argues for both the mere-sufficiency-constraint
and the minimality-constraint and incorporates them in his
operationalization:
TheChalmers-NCC: “AnNCC is aminimal neural systemN such
that there is a mapping from states ofN to states of consciousness,
where a given state of N is sufficient, under conditions C, for the
corresponding state of consciousness.” (Chalmers, 2000, p. 31)6
Most follow Chalmers in his outline: Mormann and Koch (2007)
talk about “neural mechanisms or events which are sufficient for
consciousness,”7 and similar wording can be found in Aru et al.
(2012), Bayne and Hohwy (2013), Block (2005, p. 46), Hohwy
(2007, 2009), Hohwy and Frith (2004), Tononi and Koch (2008),
and others. Although none of the mentioned authors quotes
Chalmers (2000), the similarities are obvious. It is therefore
reasonable to assume that the Chalmers-NCC is the default
understanding of “NCC” in the neuroscience of consciousness.
Note that this operationalization does not explicitly specify
whether it refers to types or tokens: clearly my brain has some
subsystem with a state sufficient for my red-experience now. This
would count as an NCC. But we clearly want a notion of NCC
that transcends one individual brain. Thus, we should also allow
for inter-individual types of correlates for inter-individual types
of experiences: my mother’s and my brain both have tokens of
a type of correlate for red experiences. Because science aims
at generality, we aim at types-NCCs; but what we gather in
research are token-NCCs. So there are sets of NCC-data (neural
token/phenomenal token-tuples) and NCC-hypotheses (neural
type/phenomenal type-tuples).
We have to state explicitly to which type of experience we
are searching a correlate. My experience of the color oxblood
6Mapping is here best understood mathematically: there is a function such that
some states of the neural system N are mapped onto states of consciousness.
Chalmers, however, leaves it open whether the mapping ought to be understood
as bijective, injective, surjective, or projective. Depending on which type of
mapping we presume, different metaphysical positions are ruled out. But given
that Chalmers leaves the specific type of mapping open, we might presume that
these constraints on metaphysics can only be settled after the data is in. Given
the presumptions of naturalism and the mere-sufficiency-constraint, however, a
surjective mapping of states of N to states of consciousness would be the most
natural contender.
7See also: “The Neural Correlates of Consciousness (NCC) can be defined
as the minimal neuronal mechanisms jointly sufficient for any one specific
conscious percept.” (Mormann and Koch, 2007). Interestingly, the reference
“(Crick and Koch, 1990)” cited by Mormann and Koch (2007) does not contain
this characterization. The minimality-constraint as well as the mere-sufficiency-
constraint were both first introduced by Chalmers in 2000. A similar rendition
of the NCC, again without mentioning Chalmers, can be found in Koch (2004)
and Koch (2012 p. 42): “In the early 1990s, Francis Crick and I focused on
what we called the neural (or neuronal) correlates of consciousness (NCC). We
defined them as the minimal neural mechanisms jointly sufficient for any one
specific percept.” However, they never defined “NCC” like this before Chalmers’s
article in 2000. Although there might be some informal precursors, the written
record does not support these statements by Koch and colleagues. In a more
malicious interpretation, it might be an instance of “editing out” philosophical
contributions to the neuroscience of consciousness. According to Kuhn (2012),
such “boundary work” (cf. Gieryn, 1983) is a sign of a science’s transformation
from a pre-paradigmatic stage to a “normal science.” Be that as it may, the missing
reference to Chalmers’s article suggests a misappropriation of credit.
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now will only have one neural correlate, namely that minimal
neural activation that was actually sufficient for me seeing
oxblood. But we may talk of broader and broader types, e.g.,
red experiences, color experiences, visual experiences, sensory
experiences, experience while being awake, and so on. The most
general correlate we may be interested in is what distinguishes
all conscious mental activity from un- or preconscious mental
activity. Call this the general NCC (or neural correlate of general
consciousness).
If the goal of a neuroscience of consciousness is to find
Chalmers-NCCs, then we intend to find minimal neural systems
which can be activated in such a way that this activation is
sufficient (but not necessary) for some experience. I argue
that this is not what we ought to search for because it has
several systemic disadvantages (section 2). If there is a way to
operationalize “NCC” without running into these disadvantages
while upholding mere-sufficiency and minimality, we ought to
prefer this operationalization (section 3).
2. FOUR REASONS WHY CHALMERS’S
OPERATIONALIZATION IS
UNSATISFACTORY
Say the main goal of a neuroscience of consciousness really
was finding Chalmers-NCCs. What would and wouldn’t we
gain from this project? If the acceptability of operationalizations
hinges in part on their pragmatic value, and if we gain too little
from knowing just Chalmers-NCCs, we may want to search for
something other than Chalmers-NCCs.
In the following, I take Chalmers’s operationalization literal
for the sake of the argument. Let us imagine a state where we
just knew which neural entities fulfil the conditions for being
Chalmers-NCCs. What wouldn’t we get?
2.1. Problem 1: Neural Correlates of
Capabilities or of Occurrences?
According to Chalmers’s operationalization, a neural system is
a Chalmers-NCC in virtue of some of its possible states. But it
is the neural system which is the Chalmers-NCC, not any of its
states. However, systems persist independently of the individual
states they are in. (My washing machine, for example, exists
independently of whether it is in the off-, colored-, or lingerie-
setting.) Therefore, an organism omay possess a Chalmers-NCC
for an experience e (e.g., pain) even if it is not in the state which is
sufficient for e. Knowing that o’s nervous system has a Chalmers-
NCC for e does not help then to determine whether o currently
has this kind of e-experience (i.e., feels pain or not). In order to
determine whether o feels pain, we would need to know whether
a Chalmers-NCC is in the specific pain-conducing state, the state
that is sufficient for pain experiences.
Systems also may possess states which they never reach. (My
washing machine, for example, has a setting for lingerie; but I
never used it, so it never was in that state.) Consider then an
extreme case: some organism o’s nervous system has a minimal
subsystem Ne. Ne is a Chalmers-NCC for the experience of
tasting jackfruit in virtue of a state ne of Ne which is sufficient
for such jackfruit-experiences. By mere coincidence, Ne never
was in state ne during the whole of o’s existence—o never had
any experience of tasting jackfruit.8 However, taking Chalmers’s
operationalization literally, o still possesses a Chalmers-NCC of
experiencing the taste of jackfruit—even though it never had or
will have an experience of that sort. So in accord with Chalmers’s
operationalization, organisms can have neural correlates for
never occurring experiences. The Chalmers-NCC is therefore not
a correlate of the experiences themselves—it cannot be because
systems and experiences are indifferent ontological categories
with different beginnings, ends, and dynamics. At most, the
Chalmers-NCC is a correlate of the capability to have such
experiences.
If the Chalmers-NCC is only an operationalization of the
capability to have certain experiences, it may have some
disadvantages in application. Because in some of the most
pressing cases of application, what we really are interested
in are the correlates of occurring experiences: in monitoring
anaesthesia, we want to know whether this patient now feels
pains, not whether she can experience pains; in comatose care, we
want to know whether this patient suffers now, not whether she
is capable of suffering at all; in animal welfare, we want to know
whether dogs feel pain during castration, not whether they can
feel pain in general. Knowing that some organism has a neural
pain matrix which can bring about pain experiences does not
solve these issues. We want to know when this neural subsystem
is in the state in question in order to use neural activation as
evidence for that organism being in pain.
This shortcoming may be easily fixed by making the neural
states or processes themselves the NCC, not the system which is
in these states.
2.2. Problem 2: Neural Evidence for Ruling
out Experiences?
Say we consider states rather than systems as NCCs. Then,
detecting a certain neural activation nmay be treated as evidence
for some organism currently having the experience for which n
is an NCC. For example, if we detect state ne in a patient under
anaesthesia—ne being a neural correlate of pain—, we gather
evidence that this patient is currently experiencing pain.
But in some cases of application, we may want to be more
cautious: in anaesthesia, we may want to rule out that a patient
is currently experiencing pain; in comatose care, we may want be
certain that a patient is not experiencing pain; in animal ethics,
we may want to ensure that castration does not hurt the dog.
Ruling out the occurrence of experiences based on neural
evidence is blocked by the mere-sufficiency-constraint: if I know
that A is sufficient for B, I cannot rule out that B is absent
if A is absent. If I were to assume the absence of B due to
the absence of A, I would commit the fallacy of negating the
antecedent. Say spitting on the street is sufficient for a fine; if
you know that I did not spit on the street, you still cannot infer
that I did not get fined—I might be fined due to jaywalking or
insulting a policewoman. Several circumstances can be sufficient
for something to happen. If we presume that a patient or
8Maybe you are such a system.
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organism is not feeling (or cannot feel) pain, because a specific
minimally sufficient neural state n1e for pain cannot be detected,
we would commit the same fallacy.9 Because any neural state can
only count as merely sufficient for an experience like pain, we
can never rule out that some organism feels pain—because there
could always be some other state n2e that the organism is in, which
is also sufficient for pain. Due to the mere-sufficiency-constraint,
we can never rule out that somebody currently is undergoing
some experience based on neural evidence.
One might think that this is too quick: we might rule out
that an organism has a certain experience like pain if we fail
to detect all Chalmers-NCCs for pain. But we will never be in
the position where we know that we have detected all neural
states minimally sufficient for pain. In order to do so, we would
need to know what is neurally necessary for pain. But this seems
to go against the mere-sufficiency-constraint. Because the mere-
sufficiency constraint is reasonable to uphold, we can never rule
out that some organism currently has any arbitrary experience
based solely on neural evidence. This would severely limit the
applicability of NCC-research.
2.3. Problem 3: Multiplicity or Uniqueness
of NCCs?
An operationalization can be artificial—it does not need to
capture any real usage, but instead establishes how to use a term.
But if accepted, it ought to mirror what people intend to search
for or how they talk about what is operationalized. Otherwise,
there will be a mismatch between usage and operationalization.
Some degree of deviation between operationalization and usage
is acceptable. However, concerning the Chalmers-NCC, there
might be too much deviation between operationalization and
actual use.
Chalmers’s operationalization allows many Chalmers-NCCs
for the same conscious experience (each being sufficient for that
experience). So any Chalmers-NCC can only be addressed as a
NCC, not the NCC. Talking of the NCC, however, is a common
way of speaking (see e.g., Crick and Koch (1998, p. 35), Crick and
Koch (2003), Block (2005, p. 49), Lamme (2006), Singer (2016)).
It is also common to criticise a proposal as not being the
NCC proper: Ned Block argues that there is only one NCC for
visual phenomenality (Block, 1998, 2005); Crick and Koch (1995)
hold that only those activations which are directly projected
to the prefrontal cortex are the NCCs of visual consciousness,
with other activations being in its “penumbra”.10 Even though
the activation of some neurons will correlate strongly with
experience, this activation does not count as part of the NCC.
This talk of the NCC suggests uniqueness, but Chalmers’s
operationalization does not capture this uniqueness due to
9Rose (2002) has argued in this fallacious way for fishes being incapable of feeling
pain: he writes that they cannot experience pain because they lack a cortex, and
a cortex brings about experiences in us. Therefore, fishes cannot experience pain.
However, if any neural correlate is merely sufficient for an experience, then some
other neural structure may suffice for pain experiences. The lack of a cortex
therefore does not rule out that fishes feel pain.
10“The NCC at any one time will only directly involve a fraction of all pyramidal
cells, but this firing will influence many neurons that are not part of the NCC.
These we call the ‘penumbra’.” (Crick and Koch, 2003, p. 124)
the mere-sufficiency-constraint.11 If we want to capture the
intended uniqueness of NCCs, we have to amend Chalmers’s
operationalization. But uniqueness can only be established by
providing necessary conditions, which seems to be ruled out by
the mere-sufficiency-constraint.
2.4. Problem 4: Experimentum Individualis
or Experimentum Crucis?
For any scientific field, being able to comparatively test
hypotheses is a methodological desideratum: given some data,
which of an array of hypotheses is best supported by this
data? An experimentum crucis is an ideal form of comparative
testing. In an experimentum crucis, we do not only seek to find
which hypothesis is best supported, but also shrink the array of
competing hypotheses by rejecting some: given some data, which
hypothesis is best supported and which are falsified? Chalmers’s
operationalization seems to block us from using this valuable
methodological tool for NCC-research.
When do hypotheses compete? First, they have to be general
enough in order to cover the same ground, i.e., concern type-
correlates. There are some theories of consciousness which
implicate type-correlates. Any such theory can only count as
a general theory of consciousness if it intends to implicate all
specific NCCs or the general NCC. 12 If there are two hypotheses
H1 and H2 where both claim to be such general theories of
consciousness, they only count as different if they are not co-
extensional. They are not co-extensional if and only if they
implicate diverging sets of neural activation being NCCs. So for
each of these theories, there is at least one potential NCCuniquely
implicated by it. But then, not both can be general and true
hypotheses: Either each fails to implicate a proper NCC (by which
they are not general), or one implicates a false NCC (wherefore it
is not true). So either we believe that neither theory is general—
both are only part of the full story; or we believe that at least
one is false. We may try to figure out which one is most likely
the true and general theory of consciousness by finding evidence
that forces us to reject one but not the other. One way to do so
effectively is by an experimentum crucis.
We may reject one of the competing theories either by
evaluating the plausibility of each in itself; or we can evaluate
them in comparison. If we evaluate each theory on its own, we
would see for each theory if the NCCs it implicates actually do
correlate with the experiences in question. If these implicated
NCCs do correlate with experiences, then that theory becomes
corroborated; if they fail to correlate with experiences, that theory
looses credibility. But this is a laborious way of testing, because
for each candidate, we have to go through all implicated NCCs.
A more efficient way may be the experimentum crucis.
Empirical hypotheses, theories, paradigms and so on
(abbreviated as H) describe ways the world could be: if H
11But maybe these scientists speaking of the NCC thereby merely attest that some
neural states are not minimal neural correlates? This is certainly true for the
penumbra. However, the usage of “the” suggests that the proposedminimalNCC is
seen as the unique neural correlate of that experience. Seeing any minimal NCC as
unique would not be admissible if the proposed neural activations were considered
to be Chalmers-NCCs.
12“NCC” in this section is used in a pre-operationalized way, if not indicated
otherwise.
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is true, such-and-such is the case. But H also restricts the ways
the world could be: if H is true, such-and-such cannot be the
case. Experiments can be understood as manipulating the world
to see whether it conforms with some specific H, i.e., whether H
describes not only a possibility but actuality. Let us individuate
hypotheses by those “ways the world could be” that they are
compatible with.13 Any hypothesis can then be associated with a
set of possible scenarios.14 Any possibility not in this set counts
as incompatible with this hypothesis. For example, Aristotle’s
hypothesis about the acceleration of falling objects can be
associated with all those possible scenarios where a heavy object
falls faster than a lighter one; Galilei’s hypothesis is associated
with those where all objects fall equally fast; each associated set
of “ways the world could be” is incompatible with the other.
Understood in this way, hypotheses H1 and H2 stand in
competition if and only if they each share at most some but
certainly not all ways the world could be with each other15.
Then, there are some scenarios that are compatible with one
but incompatible with the other and vice versa (see Figure 1).
FIGURE 1 | An Illustration of Inter-Hypothetic Competition. Let each
point inside the border stand for a way the world could be, a possible
scenario. Each circle picks out those scenarios compatible (i.e., not excluded)
with some hypothesis. Hypotheses H1 and H2 stand in inter-hypothetic
competition because for each, there are scenarios compatible with one but
incompatible with the other. ×s mark exemplary decisive events (e1). If such
an e1 is observed, the credibility of one hypothesis rises while the other
simultaneously declines.
13This can be understood as an extensional way to individuate hypotheses. Clearly,
two hypothesesH1 andH2 could be compatible with the sameways the world could
be, but look differently. Maybe they use different formulas, and different looking
calculations, different names, etc. but still are compatible with the same ways the
world could be. These, however, shall not be of interest here, because there is no
way to decide between these hypotheses by experiment. Here, I will restrict myself
to hypotheses that stand in inter-hypothetic competition which can be resolved via
some experiment or data-gathering.
14That is, they resemble propositions under some understanding of the term (cf.
Montague, 1960).
15If they share no members, they do not even share the factual descriptions of
reality. Either at least one is purely fictional or they simply range over different
sections of reality: one might be an economic theory about asset price inflation,
the other a theory about DNA-methylization. In such cases, they hardly compete,
because one can believe both. However, there might be some hypotheses that do
not overlap explicitly, but implicitly. A theory about motor control in mammals
and another about motivated action might not look like they overlap, but they do
because they can have incompatible implications.
If something like this is the case, then one cannot rationally
believe both hypotheses because they are mutually exclusive: for
example, if H1 where Aristotle’s theory about the acceleration of
falling objects, and H2 were Galilei’s, then one cannot believe
both together: heavy objects cannot fall as fast as light one’s and
simultaneously faster.
If two hypotheses compete in this way, they enable
experimenta crucis which clarify our doxastic allegiances, i.e.,
determine which of these hypotheses we ought to believe. The
goal of an experimentum crucis is to investigate a scenario
predicted by one theory but excluded by the other as being
a way the world could be. If the world behaves as predicted,
then this simultaneously corroborates the predicting hypothesis
and discredits its competitor. The events investigated in these
experimenta crucis are therefore decisive (e1, examples of which
are marked by × in Figure 1), because they boost the credibility
of one hypothesis while deflating the credibility of the other. In
the ideal case, they decide which of the two hypotheses must be
preferred.16
Some hypotheses in the neuroscience of consciousness look
as if they allow for experimenta crucis. However, if these
theories only implicate Chalmers-NCCs, an experimentum
crucis is blocked: any Chalmers-NCC is merely sufficient for
an experience, and therefore does not exclude any other
neural state from also being a Chalmers-NCC. Given that we
want to have a way of comparatively testing different general
theories of consciousness, it would be beneficial to alter our
operationalization of “NCC,” ideally in such a way that it allows
for experimenta crucis.
2.4.1. A Possible Example of Inter-Hypothetic
Competition in NCC-Research?
Are there any examples of competing hypotheses in the history
of NCC-research? There are two conditions for competition:
first, the two hypotheses must make or imply claims about
neural correlates for the same type of experience. (NCC-
hypotheses for color vision do not directly compete with NCC-
hypotheses for audition.) So our best bet to find competing
hypotheses is among those aiming at general consciousness, i.e.,
hypotheses that focus on what distinguishes arbitrary conscious
from unconscious mental processes. Second, the two hypotheses
must differ in at least one ascription of consciousness to some
specific neural event in a system. If the same ascriptions are
implied by two hypotheses, they are empirically and extensionally
undistinguishable.
Two hypotheses, which likely fulfil these two conditions,
are the Recurrent Processing Hypothesis (RPH), according to
which the occurrence of consciousness depends on recurrent
processing (see Supèr et al., 2001; Lamme, 2004, 2006); and
the Integrated Information Hypothesis (IIH), according to
which the occurrence of consciousness depends on integrated
information (see e.g., Tononi, 2004, 2008; Balduzzi and
Tononi, 2009; Aleksander and Gamez, 2011; Oizumi et al.,
16That is: if an ideally rational subject s compares H1 and H2 and if a decisive
event e1 is observed, then the s’s credences (Ps) should alter in the following way:
([Ps(H1|e1) > Ps(H1)] ∧ [Ps(H2|e1) < Ps(H2)])∨([Ps(H2|e1) > Ps(H2)] ∧
[Ps(H1|e1) < Ps(H1)]) or, simpler put: [Ps(H1|e1) > Ps(H1)] ≡ [Ps(H2|e1) <
Ps(H2)]. The credibilities of H1 and H2 are entangled.
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2014). (As I treat both hypotheses as examples for a more
general point—methodological problems raised by Chalmers’s
operationalization—it is excusable that I focus mainly on
IIH’s early iterations up to 2009.)17 Both Lamme’s and
Tononi’s theories can be read as general neuroscientific theories
of consciousness because both intend to indicate which
neural activations come with (arbitrary) conscious experiences
and may be used as neural evidence for consciousness: if
some neural activation in a neural system N has feature F
(here: processes using recurrent connections or integrating
information), then this suffices for that system being conscious.
All and only those neural activations with F are NCCs, but
Lamme and Tononi differ on the NCC-making feature in
question.18
According to IIH, if some system s generates some degree
of integrated information (8 > 0), then s is phenomenally
conscious—and if 8 = 0, s is unconscious. Tononi argues by
analogy: phenomenologically, our experiences are governed by
differentiation and integration. We can have a wide variety of
experiences (the sound of a loved one’s whisper, the pangs of pain,
the pulsing pleasures of orgasms, the rich vibrancy of purple, and
so on); but whatever experiences we are having in a moment,
all are incorporated in a holisticme-being-in-the-world-with-this-
and-that-happening-now (see e.g., Brentano, 1995; Heidegger,
1986; Bayne, 2010). Tononi holds that an analogous feature can
be defined in informational terms: the changes of some part of
a system not only generate information by themselves, but also
about other parts of the system. This information generation
may be so tightly entangled in certain complexes that such
a complex as a whole generates additional information. Some
ways to calculate such “integrated information” (8) have been
presented, for example, in Tononi (2004, 2008) and Balduzzi and
Tononi (2009)19. (How to calculate 8 has changed in version
3.0 of the theory (Oizumi et al., 2014) such that a competition
with RPH is less obvious. IIH-2014 will largely be ignored
here).
17The Integrated Information Hypothesis has changed considerably over time:
there are different versions by Tononi, where the motivation for differences and
divergences from earlier iterations are often unclear. In addition, there are several
competing proposals to Tononi’s on how to assess the amount of integrated
information (8), e.g., Seth et al. (2006); Barrett and Seth (2011); Seth (2011); and
Aleksander and Gamez (2011). I will focus mainly on Tononi’s approach up to
2009 (Tononi, 2004, 2008; Balduzzi and Tononi, 2009). Some of what I say will
not hold for newer iterations, e.g., Oizumi et al. (2014). But I merely discuss both
theories as examples to illustrate a shortcoming of Chalmers’s operationalization.
It therefore suffices that there was some moment in the past where two general
theories of consciousness competed. Between 2004 and 2009, we can be confident
that such a competition was the case.
18Unlike many other proposals, neither theory refers explicitly to any specific type
of experience (e.g., seeing color, hearing, feeling one’s body) or to any anatomical
or biochemical features. Instead, both see broadly computational, topological, or
architectural features as crucial. Thus, their proposals—if tenable—might even
apply to artificial systems.
19Here, the governing formula to calculate 8 for some system in state x1 is
8(x1) = ei[(X0(MIP, x1) → X0(mech, x1)], where ei is the effective information,
X0(mech, x1) denotes the repertoire of potential states given some mechanism
governing that system and MIP stands for the minimal information partitions.
Alternatives for assessing8 have been proposed (Seth et al., 2006; Barrett and Seth,
2011; Seth, 2011; Aleksander and Gamez, 2011; Tononi, 2012a,b). For lack of space,
these will ignored here. See also Edlund et al. (2011) as well as Joshi et al. (2013).
According to RPH, if some system s engages in recurrent
processing (i.e., feeds information back from latter stages
of processing to earlier stages), then s is phenomenally
conscious—and if there is no recurrent processing going
on in s, then s is unconscious. While Tononi starts from
phenomenology, Lamme (2004, p. 867f) bases this hypothesis
on several observations in vision research. First, if we present
two stimuli very shortly after one another (e.g., 40 ms delay),
the first stimulus still causes a feed-forward sweep of activation,
but is not consciously seen (Enns and Di Lollo, 2000). Recurrent
processing of the first stimulus is suppressed by the feed-
forward sweep elicited by the second stimulus, producing a
kind of backward masking (Lamme and Roelfsma, 2000; Lamme
et al., 2002). Second, in a binocular switching paradigm, we
present two stimuli, one to each eye simultaneously. The features
that distinguishes objects from their backgrounds are switched
from one stimulus to the other. For example, one eye sees
a red face on a green background and the other a green
face on a red background. Each stimulus is processed feed-
forward; but in each moment, only one is consciously seen—
namely the one being recurrently processed. The other, purely
feed-forward-processed stimulus remains invisible (Moutoussis
and Zeki, 2002). Third, if we disrupt neural activation with
transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) after a stimulus has
evoked a feed-forward sweep, the stimulus is rendered invisible
(Corthout et al., 2000). So if there is no recurrent processing,
the stimulus lacks phenomenal character. Fourth, feed-forward
processing can still be recorded in anaesthetized animals, who
are presumed unconscious. Recurrent processing, however, is
drastically reduced during anaesthesia (Lamme et al., 1998).
Fifth, in figure-ground-segregation tasks, if stimuli are reported
as “not seen” although they are present, feed-forward activation
is still happening: the stimuli cause neural activation and are
processed. According to Lamme(2004, p. 868), a “neural correlate
of figure-ground segregation, probably mediated by recurrent
interactions between V1 and extra-striate areas, and present
when stimuli are seen, is, however, fully suppressed when stimuli
are not seen (Supèr et al., 2001).” So there seems to be some
correlation between visual experiences and recurrent activation.
Lamme extends these insights to phenomenality in general:
recurrent activation is the general neural process by which a
system brings about consciousness.20
RPH and IIH cover the same subject matter: which systems in
the world are conscious under which circumstances—and which
aren’t. If we want to construe an experimentum crucis between
these two theories, we might want to search for systems to which
conscious experiences are ascribed by one hypothesis but not by
the other. We may then investigate the systems in question for
the presence of consciousness. If we can detect consciousness
reliably, we may then find confirmation of one hypothesis and
disconfirmation for the other in such “decisive systems.” Such
systems can be found.
20“According to such empirical and theoretical arguments, [recurrent processing]
is the key neural ingredient of consciousness. We could even define consciousness
as recurrent processing.” (Lamme, 2006, p. 499). Taking the proposal that
consciousness can be defined as recurrent processing at face value, recurrent
processing would count as sufficient for consciousness.
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According to the 2008-version of IIH (Tononi, 2008, p. 235),
if we increase the number of neurons that all need to be active
in order to excite an and-gate neuron in a higher level, then
each lower level neuron we add increases the 8-value of this
system (see Figure 2A). But such a system would not have
any recurrent connections. IIH in its 2008-version therefore
ascribes experiences to the system, while RPH would deny it
consciousness.21 Second, Tononi (2008, p. 225) presents a system
which generates no integrated information (8 = 0) if all its
neurons are active. We can count some of the connections as
recurrent. (A similar system can be found in (Oizumi et al.,
2014, 14) where 8 borders on 0; similarly, subsystems of a
system can have 8 = 0 in version 3.0 despite possible recurrent
processing.) Thus, if all neurons in this system are active, then
there is recurrent processing going on but8 = 0 (see Figure 2B).
Thus, IIH-2008 ascribes no consciousness to a system, where
RPH attests it to be conscious. Third, consider that a 0 carries just
as much information as a 1—the information carried by 0100001
in binary differs from the information carried by 11. This applies
equally to a brain: inactivation of a neuron carries information,
e.g. about the absence of a stimulus. If so, then an inactive brain
may have 8 > 0 and therefore be conscious according to all
versions of the IIH.22 Obviously, there would be no recurrent
21This does not apply anymore to the newest version of IIH: Oizumi et al. (2014,
p. 21) present a highly complex feed-forward system, but where8MAX = 0.
22Tononi and collaborators explicitly state this as a possibility through different
versions of the integrated information theory: “Thus, the theory predicts that a
brain where no neurons were activated, but were kept ready to respond in a
differentiated manner to different perturbations, would be conscious (perhaps that
nothing was going on)” (Tononi, 2004, p. 19)
“Inactive elements specify the shape of a quale. The assumption that neural
elements that are active are broadcasting information often goes hand in hand with
the corollary that inactive elements are essentially doing nothing, since they are
not broadcasting anything. According to the [integrated information theory], this
is not correct. In the general case, being ‘off ’ is just as informative as being ‘on’.”
(Balduzzi and Tononi, 2009, p. 14)
“[The integrated information theory] predicts that, even if all the neurons in amain
complex were inactive (or active at a low baseline rate), they would still generate
consciousness as long as they are ready to respond to incoming spikes.” (Oizumi
et al., 2014, p. 17)
“That silent neurons can contribute to consciousness is because, in IIT,
information is not in the message that is broadcast by an element, but in the form
of the conceptual structure that is specified by a complex. Inactive elements of
a complex specify a cause-effect repertoire (the probability of possible past and
processing going on. Then, IIH in any iteration would ascribe
consciousness to an inactive (but revivable) brain while RPH
would not.
Both IIH and RPH can be considered general theories of
consciousness. Both have the same subject matter. Both implicate
certain types of activation as being NCCs, neutrally construed:
each makes mutually excluding predictions about when systems
are conscious (and when not). It seems therefore that there
is potential for inter-hypothetic conflict: either both are only
partial theories of consciousness, or (if they are not partial
theories of consciousness) they stand in competition. Whether
consciousness arises in these systems determines the outcome
of an experimentum crucis between IIH and RPH: for each
theory, there is at least one way the world could be (systems like
2a–2c being conscious or not) that lowers the credibility of one
hypothesis and simultaneously raises the credibility of the other.
It seems that experimenta crucis are possible in a neuroscience of
consciousness.
2.4.2. The Problem: Chalmers’s Operationalization
RPH and IIH seem to differ on which neural events can be
considered NCCs, and it seems that if we take them to be general
theories of consciousness (which they are intended to be), we
ought to consider them as standing in competition. Can we
perform an experimentum crucis if we consider each theory as
implicating only Chalmers-NCCs?
No, because recurrent processing as well as 8 > 0
can simultaneously be Chalmers-NCCs: if an inactive brain is
consciousness, then 8 > 0 is sufficient for consciousness;
but this does not speak against recurrent processing being
sufficient for consciousness as well. Having Gouda is sufficient
for serving cheese for desert, but this does not rule out that
Stilton is sufficient as well. Despite appearance, if these theories
only implicate Chalmers-NCCs, none of the crucial instances in
Figure 2 suffices for an experimentum crucis. Although both IIH
and RPHmake diverging predictions, there is no inter-hypothetic
competition between them—and there cannot be any if they only
implicate Chalmers-NCCs.23
future states) just as much as active ones (think of the dog that did not bark in the
famous Sherlock Holmes story).” (Tononi and Koch, 2015. p. 10)
23This lack of pressure to choose among theories of consciousness is reflected in the
way that the science of consciousness developed: there has been a massive influx of
FIGURE 2 | Three decisive instances. According to RPH, (A) and an inactive (but activatable) brain (C) are unconscious, while (B) may bring about consciousness;
according to IIH-2008, (B) is unconscious and (A) is conscious, while (C) can be conscious in all of IIH’s iterations.
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There are several ways how one may react to this lack of
inter-hypothetic competition. First, one might see both IIH
and RPH as special cases of a different, more overarching
theory. This means that we give up counting each as a
general theory of consciousness. This motivates an additional
search for the overarching theory. Second, one might think
that consciousness is just not governed by natural laws. So
each of the two features (recurrent processing and 8 >
0) correlates contingently with consciousness in some cases,
but not in others, and we cannot say why. This mysterian
option must be unattractive to any naturalist, and it would
have terrible practical consequences as well: we could never be
certain that anaesthesia works on you, because consciousness
does not follow any rules predictably. It is the worst option
for anybody interested in a natural science of consciousness.
Third, we might reconsider whether these theories implicate
only Chalmers-NCCs, or what the relation between Chalmers-
NCCs and general theories of consciousness ought to be. Because
Chalmers’s operationalization has further drawbacks, as I argued
above, I explore this third option.
3. AN ALTERNATIVE ACCOUNT: TOWARD
AN NCC2.0
I presented four shortcomings of Chalmers’s operationalization
of “NCC”. Because any operationalization is based on a decision,
these drawbacks might lead us to rethink whether we made the
right decision in preferring Chalmers’s operationalization over
possible alternatives. Even if Chalmers captured some plausible
meaning of “NCC”, it seems that “NCC” ought to refer to
something else, something which does not give rise to these four
issues, something like an NCC2.0.
Here is the challenge. On the one hand, any NCC2.0 ought
to uphold the mere-sufficiency-constraint in order to (i) be able
to account for neural redundancy and neural plasticity, (ii) be
compatible with the possibility of artificial experiencers, silicon
brain prostheses, or extended neural+x-bases of consciousness.
On the other hand, in order to overcome some of the
problems of the Chalmers-NCC, it seems that we have to
introduce necessity somewhere. Only then can we allow for
inter-hypothetic competition, and only then can we apply our
best NCC-hypotheses to cases where we want to rule out that
an organism currently is feeling something based on neural
evidence. The crux for any NCC-operationalization is then
to balance mere sufficiency of neural activation for conscious
experience with some kind of necessity of neural activation for
consciousness.
NCC-theories since the mid 1990s, but there is still no paradigmatic theory. There
are nearly as many NCC-theories around as people attending conferences, making
NCC-theories more like toothbrushes than anything else: everybody has their own,
and one hardly wants to use someone else’s. Additionally, hardly any experimenta
crucis are reported, not even speaking of attempts to reject a theory. Instead, certain
theories are merely abandoned: Lamme seems to have abandoned his own in favor
of Tononi’s, but we do not know why; Tononi changed the way to calculate8 from
article to article, but we do not know exactly how these patches are motivated. This
way of progressing is suspicous, and old-fashioned inter-hypothetic comparison is
to be preferred.
We might take a hint on how to achieve this balance from
Chalmers himself. In The Conscious Mind (Chalmers, 1996, p.
275), he advocates a form of “nonreductive functionalism, on
which functional organization suffices for conscious experience
with natural necessity. [...] We have narrowed down the relevant
properties in the supervenience base to organizational properties:
[...] for every physical system that gives rise to conscious
experience, there is some functional organization F realized by
the system, such that it is naturally necessary that any system that
realizes F will have identical conscious experiences.” Despite any
neural event being only sufficient, there is some NCC-marking
feature F: anything that is an NCC is F, anything that is not an
NCC lacks F. While F does not make some neural activation
an NCC with conceptual, metaphysical, or epistemic necessity,
we may presume that something like a unique NCC-marking
feature exists with natural necessity. We may find this NCC-
signature F a posteriori. And, most plausibly, this feature is
functional.
Building on these thoughts, my proposal is the following:
we accept mere sufficiency of the neural for the phenomenal
on the level of tokens, but claim necessity of the neural for the
phenomenal on the level of types. An operationalization then
might read:
NCC2.0: An NCC2.0 of a phenomenal type P is a type of neural
event or process N such that there is a mapping, where (i) each
neural token ni of N is minimally sufficient for a phenomenal
token pi of P,
24 and (ii) where all and only neural tokens of
N instantiate a feature-bundle F, such that F is a (naturally)
necessary condition for being an NCC of P.25
The NCC2.0 explicitly distinguishes between token- and type-
correlates. Although token-correlates are events, not systems,
they share a lot with the classical Chalmers-NCCs: neural
events ought to be minimal but sufficient, but no token is
strictly necessary for an experience. Thus, we preserve the
minimality- and mere-sufficiency-constraint on the token level.
On the level of types, we reject the mere-sufficiency-constraint—
and the minimality-constraint follows trivially from the newly
introduced natural-necessity-constraint.
The NCC2.0 is a metaphysical operationalization. It tells
us which entities out there in the world ought to count as
NCC2.0s. By accepting it, we presuppose that all individual
neural events bringing about experiences share a commonality
which distinguishes them from all other events that don’t bring
about experiences. (Methodologically, NCC2.0-hypotheses can
be differentiated by the neural feature-bundles they mark out
as being the NCC-making feature, e.g. recurrent processing, or
8 > 0). So this operationalization comes with the baggage
of an ontological commitment: in order for NCC2.0s to exist,
there must be some form of bijective or one-to-one-type-type-
mapping. Even though it is likely that something like that is the
case, we cannot be certain that such a mapping exists. We must
24The mapping of neural tokens correlating onto phenomenal tokens may be
projective, surjective, injective, or bijective.
25That is: For the mapping of neural types onto phenomenal types, we only allow
bijective mappings.
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take the following two options seriously. First, consciousness
may cross-cut any reasonable way to type the natural world
such that there is no ontological one-to-one-type-type-mapping
between neural and phenomenal types. This would be the
case if, for example, strong 4E-accounts (according to which
consciousness is extended, embedded, enactive, or embodied)
are right. Then, consciousness has no fixed neural basis, and
therefore there is no one neural type corresponding to any given
phenomenal type. Second, there might be a bijective type-type-
mapping, but the neural types could be so weirdly constructed
and complicated that we would likely never find the right
way of typing neural events, making the type-type-mapping
epistemically impenetrable. Neither option can and should be
excluded a priori.
But even if these options were the case, the NCC2.0 is a
reasonable way to phrase the goals of a non-4E-neuroscience of
consciousness. If, after a long stretch of empirical neuroscientific
research, we do not find anything in the brain fitting
this operationalization, then we have reason to believe that
consciousness is either not a natural or simple phenomenon, or
that it has no exclusively neural correlate. There may then be
a justified shift from a pure neuroscience of consciousness to
4E-accounts in the long run.
Even if strong 4E-accounts are wrong and most phenomenal
experiences have a corresponding neural type, the NCC2.0 is
open for partial contributions from 4E-accounts. It might be
that for some phenomenal experiences, neural activation suffices,
but for some other phenomenal experiences, external factors
have to contribute. For example, the phenomenality of a stable
visual experience might be something that relies strongly on
external factors, because in dreams, where visual experiences
are elicited solely by the brain, visual experiences are much
more fleeting and haphazard. The NCC2.0 allows for such
contributions, because all it claims is that all neural types whose
tokens suffice for phenomenal tokens will share a common
feature(-bundle) F. This is compatible with the idea that there
might be non-neural- or neural+x-tokens which are sufficient for
experiences. Incorporating such data might hint at more abstract
properties being the intersubjectively available marker-bundle of
conscious experience, e.g.,—as Chalmers predicts—functional or
computational properties.
So there are some initial perks of this operationalization.
But does it avoid the four problems raised against Chalmers’s
operationalization? Concerning the first problem: because some
neural event tokens are what correlates with phenomenal event
tokens, these neural events are token-correlates of occurring
experiences; thus, any organism that never had an experience
x will fail to have any x-corresponding neural token-correlate.
Concerning the second problem: because the feature-bundle F
would count as a necessary condition for some neural event
being a neural correlate, failing to detect any Fs marked out
by our best corroborated theories in some organism o—despite
our best efforts—would license the belief that o is not having
the experience that F marks. Knowing that o is incapable of
instantiatingF, we are licensed to rule out that o is at all capable of
having the experience in question. Concerning the third problem:
because F is what makes all neural tokens having FNCCs, we can
say that we search for the NCC2.0 on the type level—the feature-
bundle F that all and only token-NCCs share. We can presume
that there is one natural, unique way of typing NCCs suggested
by how we refer to F. (Still, there are many NCCs on the token
level.) Concerning the fourth problem, we would need to answer
first: how would the NCC2.0 shape research, data gathering and
its relation to theory building?
Let us focus, first, on the collection of correlation-data. Most
neuroscientific theories of consciousness, like Lamme’s, start
from bottom-up data, consisting of detections of individual
occurrences of phenomenal experiences (P-tokens: p1 at time
t1, p2 at t2, . . . ) and detections of simultaneously occurring
individual neural events (N-tokens: n1 at t1, n2 at t2, . . . ).
Each neural token here is a neural token-correlate of a token
P-experience. Our collected data-points will share numerous
features—and we cannot ensure that any collected data-point
will be minimal. In accord with the NCC2.0, we presume pre-
theoretically that there is a unique and specifiable corresponding
type of neural activation associated with that type of P-
experiences. This neural type is the P-type’s neural type-correlate.
Our goal, however, is to find out which feature-bundle marks out
all and only minimal neural token-correlates. So we hypothesize
and test in order to find a posteriori the right feature-bundle.
Generally, every type can be associated with a type-making
property or set of properties or a property bundle. Our goal is
to find the bundle of neural features that all and only neural
token-correlates of occurring phenomenal events share. How
might we do this? Consider, as an illustration, numbers being
drawn from a pot. We draw 1, 2, 3, 4, and 3. If we were to
use the type-making feature being an odd number or being an
even number, we would not cover all numbers in this set. We
might therefore settle for something like being a natural number
or being smaller than 5. We then test these two hypotheses by
drawing additional numbers from the pot. If one of them were√
2, we know which of our hypotheses is false—the pot does not
contain only natural numbers. So we proceed in two steps: first,
we construe competing hypotheses fitting our current set of data
(e.g., being smaller than 5 vs. being larger than 0); second, we
predict further data, and test our hypotheses by the data they
predict or prohibit. Rinse and repeat.
The same holds for NCC2.0-hypotheses: given the
neural-token–phenomenal-token-tuples from our data
(〈p1, n1〉; 〈p2, n2〉; . . . ), we look for what these neural tokens
have in common and what distinguishes them from other neural
tokens. Whatever bundle of neural features we choose, it must
also apply to some possible neural events outside of our original
data set. All NCC2.0-hypotheses then predict that every neural
event that has the hypothesis-respective neural feature-bundle
F correlates with the chosen type of experience. This is the
structure of NCC2.0-hypotheses.
There are two types of testing such NCC2.0-hypotheses.
First, we might look for neural states n1y, n
2
y, . . . that do not
instantiate Fx. If n
1
y, n
2
y, . . . actually do not correlate with
phenomenal tokens of type P, then we see this as corroboration
that Fx marks all neural states sufficient for P-experiences. If
n1y, n
2
y, . . . do correlate with some P-token-experiences, then
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this undermines the hypothesis that Fx marks all neural states
sufficient for P-experiences. Any new NCC2.0-hypothesis must
then take account of n1y, n
2
y, . . . correlating with P-experiences—
the NCC-making feature must then be one shared by all neural
Fx-states as well as n
1
y, n
2
y, . . . . Second, we might look for
neural states n1x, n
2
x, . . . that do instantiate Fx. If n
1
x, n
2
x, . . .
do correlate with some P-token-experiences, then we see
this as corroboration that Fx is an (a posteriori) necessary
feature of all neural events sufficient for P-experiences—only
token-correlates of P-experiences instantiate F. If n1x, n
2
x, . . .
does not correlate with some P-token-experiences, then this
undermines the hypothesis that F is a necessary feature of all
neural events sufficient for P-experiences. (See Figure 3 for an
illustration.)
If some hypothesis H∗ (stating some F∗ as a the NCC-
marking feature-bundle) becomes highly corroborated by a long
progression of successful predictions and refutations, we may
use H∗ to check whether some organism o (i) is currently
conscious by checking whether o’s nervous system is in a state
instantiating F∗, (ii) is unconscious by checking whether o’s
nervous system is not in a state instantiating F∗, (iii) cannot be
conscious by checking whether any of o’s neural subsystems is
capable of being in a state instantiating F∗. Our best NCC2.0-
hypotheses would then allow us to justifiably claim, at least in
principle, that it is more or less likely that some organism is
conscious or not—something we cannot do if we focus solely on
Chalmers-NCCs. This makes knowledge of NCC2.0 in principle
applicable to cases like anaesthetic awareness or the question
FIGURE 3 | Testing NCC2.0-hypotheses. Our set of recorded data consists
of n1, n2, n3 correlating with experiences p1,p2,p3 in the following way:
〈n1,p1〉; 〈n2,p2〉; 〈n3,p3〉. The phenomenal occurrences p1,p2,p3 are
tokens of a phenomenal type P. The neural occurrences n1, n2, n3 can be
“typed” in different ways: they share feature-bundle F1 as well as F2. This
allows us to formulate two hypotheses, H1 and H2. We test these hypotheses
by looking at neural events that instantiate one feature-bundle but not the
other, here n4 and n5. Checking whether consciousness occurs in any of
these two instances is an experimentum crucis between H1 and H2: if the
organism is in n4 while it experiences a token of P, namely p4, then F1 is the
likely NCC-marker for P-experiences—thus, H1 presents the most credible
candidate for an NCC2.0 in comparison with H2.
whether a specific comatose patient or a certain animals are
conscious or not.
A question remains about which kinds or features we ought
to prefer as NCC-making features. If we want to be open
to the possibility that animals with different neuroanatomy
(like cuttlefish) can be conscious, we should not focus too
much on neuroanatomical features. We ought to prefer
broadly neurobiological, -chemical, or even neurocomputational,
-topological, or -organizational features. If we want to be open
for contributions or applications to AI-research, we might not
want to choose neurobiological or -chemical features, but instead
focus solely on neurofunctional or -computational features—
just as IIH and RPH do. If we want to be open to substantial
contributions by 4E-accounts, we may allow for the possibility
that some experiences need contributing external factors which
a neural system is in itself incapable of producing.26 All
this is compatible with a research guided by the NCC2.0.
Chalmers himself seems to prefer functional and organizational
features, underlining his openness for artificial experiencers or
extended bases.
Coming back to experimenta crucis: if we consider RPH and
IIH as implicating NCC2.0s and not Chalmers-NCCs, there
is straightforward inter-hypothetic tension between them. Two
hypotheses are differentiable by the feature-bundle they choose
to mark token-NCCs—here, 8 > 0 or recurrent processing. We
then look whether there can be neural events that instantiate one
but not the other. Some likely candidates (at least for IIH up
to 2009) have been presented in Figure 2. If there are no such
cases of divergence for some hypotheses H1 and H2, then these
two hypotheses are extensionally equivalent, and therefore can
be treated alike. (For all practical purposes, H1 = H2). If there
is an asymmetry—all instantiations of F1 are instantiations of
F2 but not vice versa—, then we ought to check whether the
narrower hypothesis holds. (For all practical purposesH1 implies
H2). If there are symmetric cases of exclusion, as in the case of
IIH and RPH, then we can perform classical experimenta crucis:
we see which of the systems is and which is not conscious and
thereby simultaneously raise the credibility of one hypothesis
and lower the credibility of the other. The touchstone for
NCC2.0-hypotheses is then the succession of their successful
prediction.
Clearly, these ways of testing hinge on our ability to assess
whether a given system is conscious or not from the outside. For
example, we would need to determine whether an inactive brain
is conscious or not in order to compare IIH and RPH in an
experimentum crucis. Generally, this is the core methodological
problem for theory testing in empirical consciousness studies. It
deserves its own research, guided by the question: which kinds
of evidences are adequate or reliable indicators for consciousness
under which circumstances and to which degree? This challenge
is not overcome by switching from the Chalmers-NCC to the
NCC2.0. But with the NCC2.0, there is at least no fundamental
or conceptual problem for testing and comparing general theories
26For example, the phenomenal stability of the perceived world during wakefulness
can hardly be maintained by neural activation alone. In dreams, one experiences
a fleeting and changing scenery. A constantly constraining external force may be
necessary for us to have any experience of stability.
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of consciousness, just a common methodological one. The
neuroscience of consciousness searching for NCC2.0s can in
principle progress like any other science: by competing in the
game of predictive fit.
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